

3 July 1980

STATINTL MEMORANDUM FOR: []
Policy and Plans Group

STATINTL FROM: []
Deputy Director for Community Affairs

SUBJECT: Proposed Revision of [] Telephone Service, Draft B

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1. I do not concur with the proposed revision of []
for the following reasons:

a. There is a general consensus that an inordinate number of employees hold special access approvals to our most sensitive intelligence without adequate justification. There is a need to re-evaluate such need-to-know against a strict criteria. Reiteration of a Headquarters Regulation that mandates approvals for access to COMINT without review of the basis for that mandate appears out of keeping with the time.

b. The DCI has directed a review of continuing need for access to compartmented intelligence. Such a review has not been made about the historical requirement for SI access approval as a condition for access to a secure phone system within CIA.

c. The [] Special Access Control System, a DCI initiative and Presidentially approved compartmentation program is being studied for implementation. No determination has yet been made as to what COMINT related activities will merit compartmentation. This includes the issue of compartmentation or no compartmentation for a secure phone system.

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d. A recent study conducted for the SA/DCI/Compartmentation revealed that [] Agency employees out of [] sampled, had been granted SI access approvals, not because access to Signal Intelligence product is required, but solely because a secure telephone is, or was at one time, located in their work area. At the same time, these [] employees were afforded a full briefing on the U.S. Government SIGINT effort and hold potential access to any and all SIGINT in the Agency. Since the population sampled is roughly only 1/3 the total Agency population, it is permissible to project that this condition holds true for approximately [] people.

2. The requirement that SI access approval be considered a condition for access to a secure phone is premised on a security concern. It presumes that SI personnel security actions call for a greater screening effort than those for collateral (non SCI) clearances. While this may be true in some departments and agencies, it is not true in CIA. CIA staff officers meet DCID 1/14 criteria for access to SCI. Accordingly, it makes little sense to require CIA employees to be provided with documented license to extra sensitive intelligence simply because of proximity to, or use of, a secure phone.

3. It is proposed that the [] draft be revised as STATINTL follows:

"6 Telephone Service


a(2) The Office of Security has the responsibility for verifying that all personnel authorized to use the Central Intelligence Secure Voice Network (have an SI clearance) (delete) meet staff standards (new) except those persons...."

"b(3) Requests for gray telephone service and green service that requires staff level clearances for access (see paragraph a(2)) must be forwarded through the Office of Security. Each request must include a list of staff personnel in the office concerned and be accompanied by a signed statement from the head of the office certifying that controls will be established to ensure that only (SI cleared) (omit) staff (new) personnel are permitted to use these secure telephone systems."

"b(3)(c) All users of the gray telephone system and the green system, except those number series cited in paragraph a(2) must possess a staff level clearance." (new)

This revision offers a chance to avoid perpetuating in Agency regulations the SI requirement for access to gray/green phones.

It is recommended that we take this opportunity.



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